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CONTEMPLATING THE USE OF CLASSIFIED OR
STATE SECRET INFORMATION OBTAINED EX PARTE
ON THE MERITS IN CIVIL LITIGATION: BL(A)CK TEA
SOCIETY v. CITY OF BOSTON
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. I
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our demo-
cratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express
may address a group at any public place and at any time.2
[T]here is a narrow area in which the First Amendment permits freedom of
expression to yield to the extent necessary for the accommodation of another
constitutional right.3
[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination offacts
decisive of rights.4
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston,5 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, without dissent, a district court's ruling6 denying protesters 7 at the 2004
Democratic National Convention8 a preliminary injunction designed to force the
City of Boston to modify its designated demonstration zone (DZ) and remove some
of the draconian security measures surrounding the zone. 9 The injunction was
1. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
2. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
3. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 213 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
5. 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
6. Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61
(D. Mass. 2004).
7. The district court faced a series of challenges from "loose coalitions of political activists"
who had two separate and distinct arguments. Id. at 64. The first challenge was to the City's
denial for parade permits for streets that were adjacent to the convention. Id. Second, the
Bl(a)ck Tea Society challenged the design and construction of the designated protest zone and
asserted that the manner in which it was being constructed and the rules imposed violated their
First Amendment rights. Id. The Bl(a)ck Tea Society describes their organization as an "ad hoc
coalition whose purpose is supporting protesters of the DNC." BI(a)ck Tea Society, Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.blackteasociety.org/faq.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2004). The
organization's stated goal was "to create a space for others to protest the DNC and exercise their
first amendment rights." Id. The Bl(a)ck Tea Society declared they were a completely non-
violent group of demonstrators who were, in fact, worried about police brutality directed at the
protestors. Id. Nevertheless, the organization's website stated, "[F]inish the American revolu-
tion" and contained a subheading, "[tihe DNC has invaded Boston. We are ready!" Bl(a)ck Tea
Society, at http://www.blackteasociety.org/index.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2005) (banner).
8. The convention was scheduled to be held on July 26-29, 2004, at the Fleet Center in
Boston.
9. According to Judge Woodlock, the DZ had all the earmarks of an "internment camp."
Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
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denied by Judge Woodlock after he personally inspected the DZ and determined
that, given "constraints of time, geography, and safety," 10 there were no viable
alternatives-to site location or construction of the DZ itself-that could reason-
ably occur before the convention started. 11 Judge Woodlock also held an ex parte
and in camera hearing with federal officials to assess whether there had been spe-
cific threats aimed at the Convention, political leaders, or the City of Boston.12
The district court, in its memorandum regarding the motion for a preliminary in-
junction, excluded from consideration any information from the ex parte meeting
as a basis for deciding the case on the merits. 13 Although the information was not
included in the decision-making process, Judge Woodlock alluded in his ruling
that the United States did indeed have specific threat intelligence directed at the
Convention and its participants. 14 A panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court and affirmed the ruling as an appropriate time, place,
and manner restriction on First Amendment freedoms. 15
Although the district court did not use the ex parte threat intelligence it re-
ceived from the United States, Bl(a)ck Tea Society highlights the post-September
11th tension that now exists in balancing real security risks with a full and fair
opportunity to be heard by all parties. Moreover, this case reflects how constitu-
tional rights and traditional Supreme Court doctrine, used to analyze abuses of
these rights, may be impacted by the post-September 1 lth political and social en-
vironment. This conflict of policies and privileges has a direct impact on the deci-
sion-making role of judges in fashioning opinions based upon all the available
information. To be sure, there will be many more public events of all sizes where
protestors will want to have their message heard. Simultaneously, government
security officials will be weighing terrorist threat information, both domestic and
international, as well as other security risks posed to participants. Inevitably, a
collision between First Amendment freedoms and the need for a secure environ-
ment in which to express those freedoms will follow. When this collision occurs,
10. Id. at 75. The DZ was built on July 19, 2004. Id. at 68. The Bl(a)ck Tea Society filed its
motion for preliminary injunction on July 21, 2004, five days before the start of the convention.
Id.
11. Id. at 75-76.
12. Id. at 75 n.2.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12, 15 (list Cir. 2004). The Supreme
Court has long held that laws or regulations that restrict speech because of its content "presump-
tively violate the First Amendment." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,46-
47 (1986).
A time, place, or manner restriction, which by definition is not a total ban, is content-neutral
if it meets three criteria.
First, the government must have a substantial interest in the regulation that is unre-
lated to the suppression of ideas. [S]econd, the means must be narrowly tailored to
the goal of the regulation. [Flinally, reasonable alternative avenues of expression
must be left open. The tailoring requirement means that the regulation must merely"promote[] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent regulation"-not that it be the "least restrictive means" available.
Christopher Thomas Leahy, Comment, The First Amendment Gone Awry: City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., Ailing Analytical Structures, and the Suppression of Protected Expression, 150 U. PA. L.
REv. 1021, 1033 (2002) (citations omitted). See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters from
certain areas of the city was constitutional under the First Amendment as an appropriate time,
place, and manner regulation).
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a judge will once again be required to balance the basic tenet of the adversary
system against the desire to craft a judgment that considers information germane
to the underlying safety of both the litigants themselves and the public as well.
Because First Amendment rights-and necessarily other protected rights-will
likely again be curtailed at political rallies, sporting events, or any other occasion
where masses of demonstrators want their messages heard, the question becomes:
Should the judiciary be allowed to use classified information obtained ex parte and
in camera to help in the judge's decision-making process in deciding the merits of
a case?
This Note considers whether the historic principle of excluding ex parte infor-
mation to decide issues on the merits remains practical when national security is
intricately enmeshed in the litigation. Part II of the Note recalls the permitted and
prohibited uses of ex parte communications. Part III of the Note discusses the
state secrets privilege, a common-law evidentiary privilege. Part IV discusses the
Classified Information Procedures Act, 16 a federal criminal statute that permits
certain ex parte and in camera communications to safeguard classified material.
Part V details the holding and reasoning of BI(a)ck Tea Society and focuses on
Judge Lipez's concurring opinion. Part VI suggests a procedure where a judge,
who is presiding over a civil case seeking equitable relief,17 would be allowed to
use classified information obtained ex parte to help decide the merits of a case.
Part VII of the Note concludes that in limited situations, classified material viewed
ex pane and in camera may be used by a judge to help determine the merits of a
case.
II. Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
In theory, justice is rooted in the notion that "truth will emerge from two advo-
cates presenting their version of the facts in a structured format to a neutral and
detached decision-maker." 18 In Herring v. New York, the Supreme Court asserted
that this system of partisan advocacy "has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. '" 9 Because an ex parte20 communication necessarily
means that only one side of a pending matter is speaking to the presiding judge, the
threat to the opposing party is that the judge will improperly decide issues without
a fully argued and spirited debate. Thus, it is consistent with this notion of justice
that lawyers and judges presumably may not participate in ex parte communica-
16. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).
17. This Note will not discuss the ramifications of using classified information, which was
obtained ex parte, on the merits in a criminal context because such a use raises problems not
encountered in civil/equitable law. The use of such information on the merits in a criminal case
would likely pose Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment concerns that are beyond the scope of
this Note.
18. Roberta K. Flowers, An Unholy Alliance: The Ex Parte Relationship Between the Judge
and the Prosecutor, 79 NEa. L. REv. 251,253 (2000).
19. 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975).
20. The term ex pane is defined as: "Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one
party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 616 (8th ed. 2004). An ex parte communication is defined as a generally pro-
hibited "communication between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not present."
Id. at 296.
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tions, specifically on the merits of a case. 2 1 Nonetheless, not all ex parte commu-
nications are presumed to be improper.
The legal community, through the Model Code of Judicial Conduct as well as
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, has established guidelines
that help define proper and improper ex parte communication. According to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, Rule 3.5, "[a] lawyer shall not
communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized
to do so by law or court order."'2 2 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
3(B)(7), states the general rule that all judges must follow:
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or con-
sider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties
concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that... [w]here circum-
stances require, ex parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes
or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits
are authorized. 23
In the event that an ex parte meeting permissibly occurs, the judge must believe
that neither side of a dispute will gain a "tactical advantage" over the other; fur-
thermore, she must notify the opposing party of the meeting, and provide an op-
portunity for the other side to respond.24 Moreover, a judge is ethically bound to
discourage ex parte communications unless they are identified within Canon 3(B)(7)
of the Code, or "expressly authorized by law."'25 Accordingly, "[niothing is more
dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the judiciary than a one-sided com-
munication between a judge and a single litigant."'26
The stated policy behind the near total prohibition of ex parte communica-
tions is to protect the "integrity of the legal system. ' 27 Not surprisingly, there can
be serious consequences for violating this policy to both lawyers and judges alike. 28
21. Leslie Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communications, 37 Hous.
L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2000). See Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding
"that it is improper for the prosecutor to convey information or to discuss any matter relating to
the merits of the case... with the judge in the absence of counsel").
22. MODEL RuLs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5, available at http:i/www.abanet.orglcprlmrpc/
rule 3 5.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
23. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(7), available at http://www.abanet.orglcprl
mcic/canon 3.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Abramson, supra note 21, at 1356 (quoting Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla.
1992).
27. AM. BAR Assoc., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, 337 (3d ed. 1996). There
are, of course, other judicial practices that are designed to protect the "integrity of the legal
system." See, e.g., In re Coleman 299 B.R. 780, 793 (W.D. Va. 2003) ("The doctrine of judicial
estoppel has as its goal the protection of the integrity of our legal system."). Is the ability to
adapt to new "realities" another way to protect the "integrity" of the justice system?
28. See, e.g., Heavey v. State Bar of Cal., 551 P.2d 1238, 1241-43 (Cal. 1976) (suspending
attorney from practice for two years after the attorney, among other things, sent an ex parte letter
to the presiding judge on the merits of his case without providing opposing counsel with a copy
of the letter); Fla. Bar v. Mason, 334 So. 2d 1, 5-7 (Fla. 1976) (reprimanding and suspending an
attorney from practice for engaging in ex parte communications on the merits of a case with
justices of the Florida Supreme Court); In re Santini, 597 A.2d 1388, 1391-92 (N.J. 1991) (per
curiam) (reprimanding judge for improper ex parte contact with public officials on behalf of




Yet, most courts ignore the risks of impropriety so long as the ex parte meeting did
not, in fact, discuss the merits of case. 29
Aside from the excepted administrative provisions, only an established law
can overcome the presumption of misconduct associated with ex parte communi-
cations. 30 Case law suggests that these permitted ex parte meetings are held chiefly
in the dominion of the criminal justice system.3 1 For example, grand jury pro-
ceedings have historically been considered secret tribunals where targets remain
outside the sphere of knowledge; the by-product of this secrecy is that a prosecutor
has ample opportunity to communicate with the court ex parte. 32 Finally, when
issues involving national security and classified information are intertwined in a
criminal case, Congress has explicitly provided for certain ex parte and in camera
communications to take place between the government and the judge.33
Are these allowable ex parte communications suggestive of a permissible ex-
ception to the traditional advocacy system? If so, are these exceptions all of equal
value and reason? One commentator asserts that any exceptions permitted in the
name of national security should not be allowed because the government has his-
torically failed to police itself when asserting a state secret privilege. 34 Another
author concludes that "[iut is axiomatic under the American system of justice that
all sides to a dispute have a right to be heard. ' ' 35 Justice Douglas, concurring in
the Pentagon Papers case, unambiguously expressed his view that "[s]ecrecy in
judge, in part, for improper ex parte consultation with law professors); In re Conduct of Bur-
rows, 629 P.2d 820, 825-26 (Or. 1981) (per curiam) (reprimanding district attorney for making
ex parte contact with judge concerning sentencing factors of rape and robbery suspect); In re
Berk, 297 N.W.2d 28, 28-29 (Wis. 1980) (per curiam) (reprimanding attorney in criminal case
who held conference with presiding judge without defense counsel present).
29. See Flowers, supra note 18, at 283. But see In re Schenck, 879 P.2d 863, 867 (Or. 1994)
(per curiam) (holding as an improper ex parte communication a letter sent to a judge that refer-
enced another delay in a case due to a pending ancillary hearing).
30. Flowers, supra note 18, at 277.
31. "The courts have identified three areas where judges and prosecutors may meet ex parte:
investigation matters, discovery issues, and safety issues." Id. at 278; see, e.g., Glynn v. Donnelly,
485 F.2d 692, 693 (1st Cir. 1973) (ex parte conference used to help secure a witness). But see
State v. Marks, 758 So. 2d 1131, 1135-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (ex parte communications
between judge and prosecutor constituted due process violation and dismissal of charges); Por-
ter v. State, 732 So. 2d 899, 906 (Miss. 1999) (holding that arguments made by a prosecutor over
the telephone with opposing counsel in the same room were an impermissible ex parte commu-
nication).
In the civil context, ex parte communications are even more restricted. Ex parte communica-
tions that deal with procedural matters involving default judgments, clerical errors, and some
temporary restraining orders are usually permitted but are tightly controlled. See Abramson,
supra note 21, at 1384-85.
32. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 6; see also Flowers, supra note 18, at 278.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
34. Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 745,760
(1991) ("The current judicial tendency to give wide deference to government national security
claims when they come into conflict with constitutional values is unjustified by the realities of
governmental operations. Bureaucrats will almost always opt for secrecy.") (citations omitted).
Askin posits that there were "exaggerated claims of national security and/or executive privi-
lege" in circumstances such as Watergate, the bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War,
the illegal wiretapping of political groups, and arms sales to Iran. Id. at 761-62.
35. Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of American Judicial Independence, 29
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1007, 1014 (2002).
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government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors."' 36
The value of thoughtful debate and spirited advocacy that allows all claimants
the due process of the judicial system cannot be overstated. On the other hand, a
system that cannot change because of tradition is a system at risk. Remaining
mindful of the grave threats that no longer exist in a philosophical bubble, the
judicial system must be prepared to balance competing principles. As the next
section illustrates, the judicial system has balanced competing principles before,
during other periods that saw this country facing grave threats.
I. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
More than five decades ago, 37 the Supreme Court recognized that national
security concerns barred the discovery of certain material to litigants who are in
opposition to the governmerlt. 38 The state secrets privilege is recognized as an
early "common-law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to resist dis-
covery of information" that might jeopardize national security.39 It is a privilege
that is exclusively entrusted to the government alone and cannot be "waived by a
private party." 40 Simply put, "[i]f a litigant seeks to discover information for which
the executive asserts a state secret privilege, the litigant is denied access to that
information." 4 1
In United States v. Reynolds,42 the Court analyzed the history and signifi-
cance of the protection of state secrets. 4 3 Since 1953, the Court has not provided
a great deal of guidance on when or how the privilege should be asserted; nonethe-
less, the privilege has been invoked many times since the Reynolds decision.44
36. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
37. It is worthwhile to remember that this period of time in the United States was one of war,
both cold and hot. Not only was the United States embroiled in the Korean conflict, but the
proliferation of communism and nuclear weapons was a real threat to the safety and security of
the United States. Whereas today the threats come in the form of suitcases equipped with nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons and sneakers filled with high explosives, sixty years ago the
threats were in the form of long-range ballistic missiles designed for mutual destruction of en-
tire continents.
38. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
39. Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or
Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 571 (1982).
40. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted).
41. J. Steven Gardner, Comment, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: A
Proposal for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 567, 567 (1994).
42. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
43. Id. at 7-8; see also Note, supra note 39, at 571 n.6 (citing an early example of the privi-
lege).
44. In fact, one author collected nearly sixty cases where the state secrets privilege was
invoked. Gardner, supra note 41, at 584-85 nn.170-71. Notably, Gardner's research identified
only about five cases where the state secret privilege was invoked between 1951 and 1970. Id.
at 584. Yet, the time period between 1971 and 1994 revealed over fifty cases where the state
secret privilege was involved in litigation. Id. A non-exhaustive search by the author of this
Note revealed that since 1994, there have been at least seventy-two cases where the state secret
privilege has been asserted in some context in litigation. See, e.g., Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135,
1138-40, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding, in part, for the CIAto formally invoke the state secret
privilege on a claim by foreign nationals who sought injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus
relief against the government for reneging on financial agreements relating to their acts of es-
pionage); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
20051
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Reynolds concerned three separate Tort Claims Act actions brought by the
widows of civilians who were killed in the crash of a B-29 aircraft. 45 The purpose
of the B-29's flight had been to test secret electronic equipment. 4 6 During discov-
ery, the plaintiffs attempted to obtain copies of the Air Force's official accident
investigation as well as the statements of those who survived the crash. 47 The
government responded by moving to quash the motion and asserted that the con-
tents of the documents were privileged. 48 The district court granted the plaintiffs'
motion, reasoning that the Tort Claims Act made the government liable as an ordi-
nary citizen and therefore it lacked any privilege to withhold production of the
allegedly secret information.4 9 Thereafter, the government presented a formal
written claim of privilege by the Secretary of the Air Force and Judge Advocate
General of the Air Force, stating that the release of the documents posed a serious
risk to national security.50 Undeterred, the district court reaffirmed its earlier rul-
ing and ordered the government to produce the documents. 5 1 When the govern-
ment refused to turn over the documents, the court ordered "that the facts on the
issue of negligence would be taken as established in plaintiffs' favor."'5 2 The Third
Circuit later affirmed the lower court's rulings.53
The Supreme Court reversed, thus determining the rough boundaries of the
state secret privilege.54 The Court stated that judges "must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without
forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect."'55 More-
over, complete disclosure is not mandated for a judge to determine if the privilege
will be accepted; however, "U]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers."'56 The Court must be satisfied that
(concluding that due process does not "trump" claims of military and state secrets privilege);
Edmonds v. United States Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing
the case of an FBI whistleblower after the Attorney General successfully claimed the privilege,
and the judge concluded that the claimant's First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Privacy
Act claims could not be disentangled from sensitive national security information); Zoltek Corp.
v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 12, 16 (2004) (holding that requiring contractor to challenge the
government's determination that the requested material was confidential would "impose an un-
due burden").
45. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3-4.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951). Here, the appeals court
agreed with the trial court that "good cause" had been shown to force production of the docu-
ments. Id. Furthermore, the court said that because the government had consented to be sued as
a private individual, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, whatever public interest there may
be in avoiding any disclosure of accident reports in order to promote accident prevention must
yield to what Congress evidently regarded as the greater public interest involved in seeing that
justice is done to persons injured by governmental operations whom it has authorized to enforce
their claims by suit against the United States. ld. at 994.
54. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 9-10.
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given the totality of the evidence and circumstances there would be a significant
risk of harm should disclosure be forced. 57 The Court then announced a balancing
test to determine when the privilege could be properly invoked: "[w]here there is a
strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted,
but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if
the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. ' 58
Although the courts and common law have carved out many privileges for the
executive branch, the state secret privilege "head[s] the list."'59 Where a valid
state secret privilege is present, the high value of spirited advocacy is virtually
always supplanted by the need to keep sensitive information unpublished. 60 The
Fourth Circuit aptly characterized the stakes involved in invoking the privilege:
"[d]isclosures in camera are inconsistent with the normal rights of a plaintiff of
inquiry and cross-examination, of course, but if the two interests cannot be recon-
ciled, the interest of the individual litigant must give way to the government's
privilege against disclosure of its secrets of state."'61
The consequences of a successful invocation of the state secret privilege can
prove fatal to civil litigation or a criminal prosecution. In the criminal context,
charges must be dropped if invocation of the privilege results in the loss of enough
evidence that renders a "fair trial" impossible. 6 2 In civil litigation, a suit may
require dismissal if enough evidence is undiscoverable by the plaintiff, and thus,
the plaintiff cannot state a prima facie claim.63 Dismissal is also appropriate if the
claim "so hampers the defendant in establishing a valid defense that the trier of
fact is likely to reach an erroneous conclusion." 64
For example, in Molerio v. FBI, 65 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Title VII, First Amendment, and Due Process
challenges because the federal government successfully asserted the privilege.
Molerio had applied to be an FBI agent but was rejected for employment after his
background check revealed "something... to do with his family" that raised con-
cern by investigating officials. 66 After the FBI failed to provide a reason for re-
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Halkin, the court dismissed claims of
Vietnam war protestors who sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages under
the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and numerous federal statutes on the grounds
that the plaintiffs' claims were predicated on privileged information. Id. at 3, 11.
60. See id. at 7.
61. Heine v. Raus, 399 F2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1968). In Heine, the court remanded a slander
action, in which the CIA originally asserted the privilege and was granted summary judgment,
to determine whether the order to inform others that the plaintiff was a Soviet agent came di-
rectly from, or with the subsequent approval of, the Director of the CIA or his approved desig-
nee. Id.
62. Note, supra note 39, at 575 (citing Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957)
(stating that government may invoke privileges in criminal cases only at price of freeing defen-
dant)). See also Gardner, supra note 41, at 576.
63. Gardner, supra note 41, at 576-77 (citing Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935
F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming the dismissal of a wrongful death claim after the govern-
ment successfully intervened and asserted the state secrets privilege)).
64. Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
65. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 819 (citations omitted). The "family" matters about which the FBI expressed
concern involved an alleged link with a pro-Castro group that Molerio's father had been in-
volved with some years earlier. Id.
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jecting him, Molerio filed suit against the FBI alleging he was discriminated against,
and he sought injunctive relief and damages. 67 During discovery, the federal gov-
ernment refused to turn over certain documents to Molerio, citing a risk to national
security.68 After a motion by the defense to compel production, the trial court held
an in camera review of the government's affidavit that asserted the privilege and
concluded that without the privileged information Molerio could not establish a
"prima facie case." 69 Notably, the court refused to have an in camera and ex parte
hearing to compel the release of the information because "[such a hearing] would
compromise the court's objectivity by forcing it to evaluate evidence without the
assistance of opposing counsel." 70
In their evaluation, the court of appeals chose a different methodology to come
to the same conclusion as the trial court. The court wrote, "the District Court's
disposition relied upon its second mode of analysis, rather than its earlier merits
approach that we choose to follow here, and used the affidavits as a basis for dis-
missing the suit directly, instead of denying the motion to compel disclosure." 71
The Molerio appeal foreshadowed an approach that would seemingly require more
than a simple methodical invocation of the privilege.
IV. THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT
Although the state secrets privilege hails from the common law, Congress
nonetheless enacted a criminal procedure designed to protect classified or sensi-
tive material, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA). 72 CIPA is devoid
of any mention of the state secrets privilege, because, according to the legislative
history of the statute, "'[i]t is well-settled that the common law state secret privi-
lege is not applicable in the criminal arena." 73 Yet, as one commentator correctly
points out, "this understanding is simply incorrect. ' 74 This gross mis-character-
ization by Congress fuels "confusion among courts... and[, in the end,] ... may
result in less protection" for sensitive national security information, the very infor-
mation that the Act was designed to protect.7 5 If Congress does not want "activ-
ist" judges to make law then it is incumbent upon that body to enact statutes, espe-
cially statutes that involve national security and litigant rights, that solve problems
rather than create them.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 819-20.
70. Id. at 820.
71. Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
72. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).
73. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13
Am. J. CRIM. L. 277, 317 (1986) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-831, pt. 1 at 15 n.12 (1980)). But see
United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring that the
determination of whether information can be deemed "classified" for CIPA purposes must meet
the Reynolds standard).
74. Tamanaha, supra note 73, at 317. For a broad discussion of the inaccuracy of Congress'
assertion that the state secret privilege is not appropriate for the criminal law environment, see
id. at 315-24.
75. Id. at 320 (citing United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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Enacted in 1980, CIPA is a criminal procedure that was designed to respond to
the problem of "graymail. ' ' 76 The statute was the result of several recommenda-
tions made by the Congressional Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure. 77
CIPA's framework established a formal process to protect the government's classi-
fied information during both pretrial and trial activities.78 The statute was passed
by Congress "'to help ensure that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule
of law and to strengthen the enforcement of laws designed to protect both national
security and civil liberties. "79 While many of the sixteen sections are procedural
or administrative, Section 4 of CIPA relates to discoverability of classified infor-
mation and states that:
The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete
specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to
the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to
substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would
tend to prove. The court may permit the United States to make a request for such
authorization in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone.
If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing,
the entire text of the statement of the United States shall be sealed and preserved
in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event
of an appeal. 80
Furthermore, the government is entitled to an expedited interlocutory appeal at
any point before or during a trial if it is compelled to produce sensitive material or
is held in contempt for failing to produce any (court-ordered) material. 8 1
Section 4 of CIPA allows the government, without any input by opposing coun-
sel, to create a new document containing censored information for use at trial; this
has distressed at least one commentator. 82 These government created
"[slubstitutions change admissible evidence into a different form, without consent
of the defendant, for reasons unrelated to criminal justice concerns."'83 Nonethe-
76. United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (detailing the legislative history
of CIPA). "Graymail" occurs when a defendant threatens to disclose classified information
during a trial and forces the government to dismiss the case or risk disclosure of the information.
Id.
77. Tamanaha, supra note 73, at 278. For further information on the recommendations of the
committee and a comprehensive look at CIPA, see id. at 278-83.
78. See id. at 284.
79. Id. at 283 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-823, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294,
4296).
80. 18 U.S.C. app. § 4 (2000) (emphasis added).
81. Id. at § 7.
82. See Tamanaha, supra note 73, at 308.
83. Id. at 306. Tamanaha raises several compelling issues relating to these substitutions.
First, he asserts that this change to the form of evidence is "antithetical to traditional rules of
evidence." Id. at 306 n.168. These substitutions are written out-of-court statements offered to
prove the truth of the matter they assert and therefore are hearsay. Id. at 306-07 n. 168. More-
over, the "best evidence rule" requires that to prove the content of a document, its original (or
duplicate) must typically be introduced into evidence. Id. at 307 n.168. Tamanaha avers that
these substitutions are not originals or copies but are, in fact, "a summarization or selective
statement of original writings." Id. He suggests labeling these created documents as "stipula-
tions"; however, such nomenclature raises the real concern that a defendant could be forced to
stipulate evidentiary facts. Id. at 306-07 n.168.
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less, Congress designed this system of ex parte communication because a court
hearing that would expose the defense to all the sensitive material would thwart
the "very purpose" of keeping classified information away from those without a
proper security clearance. 84
CIPA authorizes judges to have ex parte and in camera communications with
federal officials that may result in the elimination of evidence, the loss of which
could alter a trial, and it provides for a de facto means of ex parte issue resolu-
tion. 85 The congressional intent behind CIPA mirrors much of the state secrets
case law,86 in as much as courts have always prioritized national security risks
over the need for fully informed parties. CIPA blurs the nebulous line between the
averred proper administrative uses of ex parte communications with improper ex
parte communications on the merits of the case.
V. BL(A)CK TEA SOCIETY V. CITY OF BOSTON
In Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston,8 7 the First Circuit, without dissent,
affirmed Judge Woodlock's denial of a preliminary injunction against the City of
Boston's Designated Protest Zone, during the 2004 Democratic National Conven-
tion. BI(a)ck Tea Society forced the court to balance three competing interests: (1)
the constitutional guarantee to peaceably assemble and protest, (2) the necessity of
keeping delegates, public figures, and citizens safe from domestic and interna-
tional terrorist threats, and (3) the long standing practice of not using information
received in an ex parte communication to decide-in whole or in part-an issue on
the merits. This trilemma presented to Judge Woodlock was given to him under
serious time constraints; he had less than five days to rule.
The refusal to order any alteration of the DZ, of course, was not the first time
that constitutional rights have been abridged in the name of national security dur-
ing a time of war or discord.88 Nonetheless, since September 11, 2001, the United
States has had to anticipate the possibility of another attack of grave proportions
within the country. This new war being waged, one fought abroad and at home, is
a type of war that no living American has ever previously experienced. Because of
the clear and present danger of more acts of terror in the cities and heartland of the
United States, judges evaluating threats to fundamental rights have little history to
guide their decision-making processes. As Judge Lipez wisely stated, "[w]hen
judges are asked to assess these risks in the First Amendment balance, we must
candidly acknowledge that they may weigh more than they once did." 89
84. Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
85. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).
86. See supra Part III.
87. 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
88. See, e.g., The Sedition Act of 1798; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (affirming
a conviction of criminal anarchy); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (affirming
conviction for violation of the Espionage Act of 1917); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (affirming conviction for violation of the Espionage Act of 1917). For a superb exposi-
tion on both The Sedition Act of 1798 and the World War I First Amendment cases, see ANTHONY
LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Random House 1991).
89. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 19 (Lipez, J., concurring).
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The convention itself had been designated a National Special Security Event
by the federal government. 90 During the convention, security was divided into
two rings. 9 1 The first ring consisted of a high security "hard zone," which the
Secret Service controlled.92 The second ring, the "soft zone," located some dis-
tance away from the convention site, was secured by local authorities.9 3 General
access was prohibited in the "hard zone" but pedestrian traffic was freely allowed
in the "soft zone." 94 Because of this security arrangement, there were limited
opportunities for protestors to "demonstrate within sight and sound of the del-
egates."95
The City, remaining mindful of the wishes of the vast numbers of demonstra-
tors, devised a protest area that was close to the "hard zone," in order to allow
demonstrators to assemble close to the Fleet Center, which was the location of the
convention. 96 This site was not chosen by local, state, and federal security offi-
cials alone but in fact was selected with the input of organizations such as the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Lawyers Guild.9 7 Still,
the zone was a harsh environment and according to the district court could simply
be described as an "internment camp." 9 8
The zone itself was ninety feet by 300 feet, under an elevated railroad track,
and heavily fortified.99 Multiple rings of jersey barriers, mesh fencing, and eight-
foot chain-link fence contained the protestors. 100 Coiled razor wire lined the top
90. In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62, a classified
document, and formalized the process for designating certain public events as National Special
Security Events. United States Secret Service, National Special Security Events, at http:II
www.secretservice.gov/nnse.shmtl (last visited Sept. 9,2004); see also White Paper, The Clinton
Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63
(May 22, 1998), available at www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/paper598.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2004)
(explaining "key elements of the Clinton Administration's policy on" Directive 63 to ensure"essential national security missions"); Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, Combating
Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62 (May 22, 1998), available at www.au.af.millau/
awc/awcgate/ciao/62factsheet.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005). Once an event is designated a
National Special Security Event, the United States Secret Service assumes the lead role in "op-
erational security," and federal resources are deployed with the goal of the operation being "to
prevent terrorist attacks and criminal acts." Press Release, Department of Homeland Security,
National Special Security Events Facts Sheet, available at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
theme=43&content=1065 (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). Since 1999, there have been at least
fourteen such events, including the 2000 Presidential Conventions, the 2000 Presidential Inau-
guration, Super Bowl XXXVI in New Orleans, the Salt Lake City Olympics, and the 2001 UN
General Assembly. Id.
91. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 10.
92. Id.
93. Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61, 65 (D. Mass. 2004).
94. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 10.
95. Id. at 11.
96. Id.
97. In fact, lawyers with the ACLU had been negotiating for nearly a year with officials from
the City of Boston. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of Massachusetts Challenges Boston's Denial
of Parade Permit During Democratic National Convention (July 19, 2004), available at http://
www.aclu.org/freespeech/freespeech.cfm?ID=16159&c=86 (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
98. Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61, 74 (D. Mass. 2004).
99. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 11.
100. Id.
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edges of the enclosure. 10 1 Bl(a)ck Tea Society likened the zone to a "pen." 102
On July 21, 2004, just five days before the start of the convention, the Bl(a)ck
Tea Society filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts seeking a preliminary injunction against the City and its protest zone. 10 3
Under strict time constraints, the district judge personally went to the DZ on July
22, held a hearing with the parties, and also met ex parte with security officials
from the United States government. 104 The ex parte meeting-in all likelihood-
presented Judge Woodlock with event-specific threat intelligence, yet it was not
considered by him in making his ruling. 105 On July 23, 2004, Judge Woodlock
denied the requested injunction. 106 The First Circuit reviewed Judge Woodlock's
decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 107 Additionally, the district court's
conclusions of law were reviewed de novo and findings of fact were reviewed for
clear error. 108
The court immediately seized on the First Amendment principles that trig-
gered the appeal. The court determined that the zone was a time, place, and man-
ner restriction on First Amendment freedoms and thus should receive an interme-
diate level of scrutiny. 109 Although the Bl(a)ck Tea Society tried to formulate this
zone as a prior restraint, 110 the court refused to analyze it as such because the City





105. Id. at 11 n.2.
106. Id. at 11.
107. id.
108. Id. Because of the various standards of review, some explanation is warranted. Here,
the court uses an abuse of discretion standard to evaluate preliminary injunction rulings because
it purportedly permits the trial judge to balance "conflicting factors." Id. The court then uses de
novo review and clear error "within" the abuse of discretion sphere. Id. (citing New Comm.
Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002)).
109. Id. at 12. For a critique of the Supreme Court's analysis of time, place, and manner
regulations, see Christopher T. Leahy, The First Amendment Gone Awry: City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., Ailing Analytical Structures, and the Suppression of Protected Expression, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1021 (2002) and Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1991).
110. For cases that discuss the prior restraint doctrine, see Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 546-47 (1993) (holding a court-ordered forfeiture of assets in a RICO case was not a
prior restraint on First Amendment rights); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969) (finding that a licensing law that granted unfettered discretion in public official
was an unconstitutional prior restraint); Near v. Minnesota ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 702
(1931) (holding a statute that permitted the use of injunctive relief against the publishing of
stories that were "malicious, scandalous, [or] defamatory" was an impermissible prior restraint).
For an excellent review of the prior restraint doctrine, see Shelley Ross Saxer, Zoning Away
First Amendment Rights, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTmMP. L. 1 (1998).
111. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 12.
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tent-neutral" regulation on speech 112 and furthermore, he recognized there was a
substantial government interest at stake. 113 The two remaining questions for the
court were: Were the restrictions the City placed on the protestors narrowly tai-
lored? And, did the development and implementation of the zone consider any
alternative means of communication for the protestors? It was obvious from the
design of the zone that it "imposed a substantial burden on free expression."' 114
According to Judge Selya, "security is not a talisman that the government may
invoke to justify any burden on speech." 115 Thus, the court looked at the security
measures being used vis-h-vis "the harms that a particular set of security measures
are designed to forfend." 116 The City argued that in light of other breaches in
security at similar past events it was justified in erecting the secure ring. 117 On the
other hand, the Bl(a)ck Tea Society asserted that there was no event-specific threat
intelligence and that the City could not rely on prior bad acts of demonstrators in
other cities to justify such a repression of constitutional rights. 118
112. Content-neutral laws are not designed to inhibit conduct typically associated with ex-
pression. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760-61 (1988). These
laws usually receive minimal or intermediate levels of scrutiny. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cn. L. Rav., 46, 47-48 (1987). There are two common forms of
content-neutral laws. The first is a time, place, or manner (TPM) regulation that restricts but
does not ban activities. A TPM regulation is valid if it is "designed to serve a substantial govern-
mental interest and do[es] not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication." City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). The second content-neutral regu-
lation is one that incidentally burdens non-verbal speech. A regulation that incidentally burdens
expressive non-verbal speech is evaluated under the O'Brien test. Under O'Brien, a restriction
of this sort is permissible if:
[1] [Ilit is within the constitutional power of the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial government interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
[41 if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
113. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 12.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. During the 2000 DNC in Los Angeles, over 180 protestors were arrested. Police,
Protesters Clash Outside Democratic Convention, at http://archives.cnn.com/2000
ALLPOLITICS/storieslO8/16/conv.protestersl#1 (last visited Feb. 16,2005). Homemade weapons
such as "slingshots with paint balls, plastic eggs with fuses attached, cans of lighter fluid, aero-
sol cans and lighters, which.., could have been used as crude flame-throwers [were found].
Also found ... were several gas masks and bulletproof vests." Id. In Seattle, Washington,
protests held during the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) turned ugly. A state of civil
emergency had to be declared after violent protests against the WTO were launched by hundreds
of protestors. President Clinton Travels to a Seattle Under Siege, State of Emergency Declared
After Turbulent Protests, at http://archives.cnn.com/1999fUS/l2/0I/wto.02/index.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 3 1, 2005).
In denying the requested injunction, Judge Woodlock recounted the recent history of using
demonstration zones during large public events and provided a relevant backdrop for using past
experiences to help determine the level of security needed at large public gatherings. Coalition
to Protest the Democratic Nat'l. Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73-75 (D.
Mass. 2004); see infra note 119 and accompanying text.
118. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F3d at 13.
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The court refused to adopt a "per se rule barring the government from using
past experience to plan for future [public] events."' 119 Still, the court was con-
119. Id. The district court recognized that the use of similar protest zones is a "recent inven-
tion," resulting in a dearth of case law on "The Law of Demonstration Zones." Coalition to
Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 73. Although it
refused to adopt such a per se rule, the district court did in fact rely on prior experiences to aid in
its decision-making process:
We have come to a point where it may be anticipated, at this and similar national
security events, that some significant portion of the demonstrators, among those who
have the closest proximity to delegates or participants, consider assault, even battery,
part of the arsenal of expression. And as a consequence, those responsible for event
safety must plan for violence. In fact, the chance for confrontation with the security
measures themselves is viewed by some as a further opportunity for expression.
Id. at 77; see supra note 7.
Judge Woodlock identified the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting held in Seattle, where
violent protests occurred, as the event that precipitated the use of demonstration zones at large
public gatherings. Id. at 73. Next, he reviewed three cases to serve as "background" in his
analysis of "The Law of Demonstration Zones." Id. at 73-74.
First, he considered a similar case from the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los
Angeles. Id. In Service Employee International Union Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, the
district court concluded that a "secured zone," some 185 acres, was not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest. Serv. Employee Int'l Union Local 660 v. City of Los
Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter SEIU]. The court concluded
that the severity of a 24-hour restriction to that much land, premised on the fear of a "worst case
scenario," could not withstand strict constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 972. Judge Woodlock noted
that this security zone was "almost eight times the size of the 'hard zone' in the BI(a)ck Tea's
case. Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d at
73. In addition to holding the "secured zone" unconstitutional, the SE1U court also found that
part of the demonstration zone did not provide an adequate alternative channel of communica-
tion for protestors. SEIU, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 972-73. The judge in SEIU issued an injunction
against the government and ordered the demonstration zone be redesigned to allow protestors'
voices to be heard by the DNC participants. Id. at 975. Judge Woodlock highlighted the fact
that after the zone was redesigned in Los Angeles, protestors "used slingshots to launch numer-
ous projectiles over the security fences at delegates ... and law enforcement office[r]s." Coali-
tion to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
Second, Judge Woodlock analyzed a case from New York where a parade permit to march by
the United Nations, in opposition to the Iraq War, was denied because police could not maintain
adequate security. Id. at 73-74; see United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F.
Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter UPJ]. In UPJ, the City of New York refused to grant
a parade permit of up to 100,000 people because of security concerns but did allow a stationary
rally within a local plaza. Id. at 20-21. The court noted that since the September 1 th attacks, all
parade routes that pass the United Nations complex have been banned. Id. at 24. Furthermore,
even though "mere speculation" isn't enough to warrant a complete ban on a medium of speech,
here, the court relied on the September 11 th attacks, a prior plot to bomb the U.N. building, and
a previous security breach in the compound of the U.N. complex as presenting a compelling
governmental interest that is narrowly tailored. Id. at 24-25. On appeal, the Second Circuit
dismissed as moot the denial of the parade permit because a decision could not be rendered in
the three days before the scheduled march. United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York,
323 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2003).
Finally, Judge Woodlock looked at another New York City case, this one involving the up-
coming Republican National Convention. Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Conven-
tion v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 74. In Stauber v. City of New York, protestors chal-
lenged the New York City Police Department's use of "pens" to forcibly assemble protestors in
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cerned with to what extent the government could, or should, rely on this type of
inferential reasoning, but in the end the court left this question unanswered and
accepted the Bl(a)ck Tea Society's assessment that there was no event-specific
threat intelligence. 120 Nonetheless, Judge Selya explicitly raised the district court's
ex parte meeting as proffering potential evidence that might lead to a different
conclusion. 12 1 Judge Selya foreshadowed and forewarned that there are "difficult
issues raised by the use of such proffers [but these] will have to be considered in
future cases." 122 The court recognized in its holding that these restrictions were
indeed "extreme," but because time limits prohibited a full examination of threat
evidence, they were nonetheless narrowly tailored. 123 In concluding that "this is a
close and difficult case," the court held that the denial of the injunction was sound
and "reasonable." 124
In fully concurring with the court, Judge Lipez wrote separately to address"some important lessons" that BI(a)ck Tea Society raised. 125 Judge Lipez's four-
part concurrence should be a map for future event planners, government officials,
and organized protestors. The first part of his opinion highlighted the timing that"shadowed every aspect of [the] case." 126 Judge Lipez urged future protestors and
security officials alike to leave adequate time for appeals to the courts. 127 Here,
the convention had been months in the planning yet the suits were filed only five
days before the convention started. 128 He reminded those involved in the case that
specific locations. No. 03-9162, 2004 WL 1593870 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2004). These "pens" are
"interlocking metal barricades" where protestors are forced to go if they wish to demonstrate.
Id. at 2. After an extensive review of mass gatherings where "pens" were used, the court held
that "the NYPD's current policy or practice of using pens at demonstrations is an insufficiently
narrowly tailored time, place or manner restriction because it unreasonably limits the movement
of demonstrators." Id. at 29.
120. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 13-14. The court positively cited to two
Supreme Court cases tacitly approving the use of past experiences, in planning future events,
with reasonably tailored time, place, and manner regulations. Id.; see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 728-29 (2000) (affirming criminal statute as a proper time, place, and manner regulation
partly because of prior experiences); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1989)
(holding New York City music noise regulation was valid, in part, because of prior experiences
with similar events in Central Park). See also Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 743-44 (6th
Cir. 1999) (affirming that a town's security plan for a pending KKK rally, which relied in part on
information garnered from other towns that had held similar rallies, was appropriately tailored);
UPJ, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd 323 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding the
denial of parade permit to march in front of the United Nations building because of two recent
security incidents). But see Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F2d 1224, 1228 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that a security zone established to keep protestors away from military parade
was an inappropriate restriction because of the government's reliance on speculative threats of
terrorism); SEIU, 114 F Supp. 2d 966, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that a security zone
established was not narrowly tailored and did not leave adequate alternative avenues of commu-
nication).
121. BI(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 13 n.3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 14.
124. id.
125. Id. at 15-16 (Lipez, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 16 (Lipez, J., concurring).
127. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
128. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
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when there is a lack of attention to details or short notice, these facts must also be
used to evaluate time, place, and manner restrictions. 129 With an apparent but
understandable sharpness, Judge Lipez said adequate time for "an event of this
magnitude .... means months or at least weeks .... [i]t does not mean five days
before the event begins." 130
The second part of Judge Lipez's concurrence addressed the choice of site,
both of the convention and DZ itself. His sound advice to planners was to consider
locations that offer a number of alternatives in the future since "[o]nce a site is
chosen, geography can dominate the legal analysis." 13 1
Next, Judge Lipez considered event-specific threat intelligence. Relying
heavily on the district court's opinion, Judge Lipez raised the very issue addressed
by this Note. How does a judge, in balancing First Amendment rights and matters
of national security, get the information he should have to fully weigh threat risks
and potential constitutional abridgements? According to Judge Lipez,.rcliance on
an inferential leap to conclude that it was more likely than not that there would be
violence in Boston because of violence at the 2000 DNC in Los Angeles is simply
not enough to seriously abridge constitutional rights. 132 Nevertheless, Judge Lipez
agreed with Judge Selya that government officials should be able to use their expe-
riences with similar events to assess, at least by way of analogy, appropriate secu-
rity measures. 133 Judge Lipez concluded that there was a "relevant... safety risk"
posed to those attending the convention, in part, from analyzing the 2000 Conven-
tion and other events where protestors had thrown objects and noxious liquids at
event-goers. 134
Moreover, Judge Lipez was clearly and justifiably concerned that the record
did not contain any specific intelligence about security risks to this convention. 135
Here, Judge Lipez referenced the ex parte and in camera meeting that Judge
Woodlock had with the representatives of the United States. Judge Lipez con-
cluded that Judge Woodlock was comforted by what he had heard in the meeting,
although he admittedly did not include the information to make his ruling. 136
Raising the timing issue once again, Judge Lipez wrote:
[t]his distinction captures the difficulties involved in trying to fashion a workable
procedure under impossible time constraints that would allow the court to re-
ceive the event-specific information it ideally should have while both protecting
the confidentiality of that information and allowing the appellant to challenge it
in some fashion.137
129. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
130. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
132. "It is true that unfounded speculation about potential violence cannot justify an insuffi-
ciently tailored restriction on expression." Id. at 17 (Lipez, J., concurring) (citing Bay Area
Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1990)).
133. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring) (citing Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 743-44 (6th Cir.
1999)). But see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 61-62 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting exclusive reliance on the experiences of other cities to justify regulation of
the First Amendment should not be allowed).
134. BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 17 (Lipez, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 18 (Lipez, J., concurring).
136. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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The competing principles of a multilateral adversary system, national secu-
rity, constitutional rights, and the maintenance of privileged secrets here collide. 138
Although the First Circuit has yet to rule on the use of ex parte and in camera
information to help determine civil litigation on the merits, Judge Lipez identified
two other circuits that have departed from custom and have either used, or asserted
such use as appropriate when national security is at stake. 139 Suggesting that this
case was ripe for confronting this very issue, Judge Lipez underscored that the
record is "devoid of intelligence specific to this event," which he found to be "un-
fortunate." 140 He concluded that "with some creative thought given to proce-
dures" there should be a way to equitably establish a more robust factual record of
the security needs at these highly guarded events. 14 1 Such a procedure would
allow judges to formulate opinions that offer the fairest possible resolution for all
the parties involved in the litigation.
The final part of Judge Lipez's concurring opinion assessed the post-Septem-
ber 11 th environment as it relates to the future of the judicial system in America.
Although he concluded his concurrence by returning full circle to the issue of time
constraints involved in the case, Judge Lipez issued a chilling warning about the
future of constitutional law jurisprudence when confronted with the new realities
of war, a war that has already been waged in the center of our cities and the skies
over them. Judge Lipez stated:
I wish to be clear. I am not suggesting that this new reality makes the First
Amendment rights of the demonstrators any less important or the vigilance that
the courts must have for those rights any less imperative. But I am suggesting
that the always difficult balancing between those First Amendment rights and the
demands of security has become even more difficult. 142
138. "We have recognized the general proposition that '[our system of justice does not en-
compass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil litigation."' Id. at 18 (Lipez, J.,
concurring) (quoting Assoc. for Reduction of Violence v. Hall, 734 F.2d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 1984)
(alteration in original)).
139. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring) (citing Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056, 1057 (1 th Cir. 1996)
and Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d at 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). See supra notes 65-7t and accompanying
text discussing Molerio v. FBI. In Vining, the trial court in a Title VII action granted a motion
for summary judgment for the defendant, the Postmaster General of the United States. Vining v.
Runyon, 99 F3d at 1056. Vining claimed he was the victim of racial discrimination and retali-
ation, and moved for the production of certain personnel records. Id. at 1056-57. The Postmas-
ter General refused to turn over the material on privacy grounds. Id. at 1057. The district court
ordered the files to be produced for an in camera and ex parte review. Id. After review, the court
granted the Postmaster General's motion for summary judgment and in its ruling specifically
identified the files reviewed ex parte as the basis for its decision. Id. On appeal, the order was
vacated because of the in camera and ex parte consideration of the personnel files used to decide
the merits of the case. Id. at 1058. Notably, the court indicated that "consideration of in camera
submissions to determine the merits of litigation is allowable only when the submissions in-
volve compelling national security concerns." Id. at 1057.
140. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d at 18 (Lipez, J., concurring).
[T]he DNC was designated by the President as a National Special Security Event,
with the Secret Service designated as the lead federal agency in the design, planning,
and implementation of security measures. However, so far as I can tell, there was no
attempt by defendant to establish the factual predicates for this national security ex-
ception.
Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
141. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 19 (Lipez, J., concurring).
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VI. EX PARTE AND ON THE MERITS: IS IT WORKABLE?
So, now what? In the divisiveness of post-September 1 1th America (sharp-
ened by close pre- and post-September 11 th presidential elections), there are many
people who present roadblocks to change, even change that may be necessary and
valuable. Who are these people that reject change? They are Americans: lawyers,
judges, law professors, senators, firemen, and construction workers. Why would
they resist valuable change? For two reasons: (1) change is hard, and (2) they
have a fundamental disagreement about what is valuable change. But although
debate is healthy, blind allegiance or stubbornness does not promote equity, fair-
ness, or respect for a system of law that has always changed in response to internal
and external events. 14 3 Change in America's system of justice is natural. Accept-
ing change and promoting change is anything but natural. Most new ideas must be
run through the litany of slippery slopes, if the idea represents any modicum of
change to the establishment. For some, particularly the liberal academic commu-
nity, any hint of greater power by the executive branch simply suggests an imper-
missible modification of the judicial system that will be rejected out of hand, with-
out any constructive exchange of ideas. This is especially true if the Executive is
mistrusted. Nevertheless, simply being an obstructionist does not always prevent
change from occurring, and failing to participate in the development of meaning-
ful change can make whatever does happen even more radical.
I have no doubt that many will have an immediate visceral reaction to the
mere thought of using ex parte and in camera inspection of classified information
to help decide litigation on the merits. Being mindful of history and advocating
change do not have to be mutually exclusive. Fear as a tool of manipulation, and
logic as a tool to promote justice and security, are hard to separate in twenty-first
century America because the dividing line between the two depends upon one's
viewpoint on how to address terrorism dangers facing the United States.
The foundation for in camera and ex parte hearings to help decide civil cases,
on the merits, is already well established. In many respects, both CIPA and the
state secrets privilege already can contribute to de facto on the merits decisions in
both criminal and civil cases. Such decisions exemplify the pendulum that swings
between what is fact and what is law. As already noted, a criminal case can be
dismissed if the government relies exclusively on classified information and will
not provide that information to the defense. Civil litigation can be summarily
dismissed if the plaintiff is unable to state a claim because of protected secrets.
Thus, the merits of these cases, although not being argued directly, are nonetheless
being decided in one form or another.
Does the unnecessary disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence, or the failure
to consider such intelligence when making a decision that could impact tens of
thousands of lives, sincerely protect the integrity of the judicial system? In cases
143. One need only recall cases such as Roe v. Wade, Brown v. Board of Education, the "red
scare" cases of the 1950s, and the Espionage Act cases of the early twentieth century to be
reminded of how the substantive law has been affected by external world events and internal
societal change. Moreover, America's system of procedural law functionally changed when
equity was absorbed into law. Substantive and procedural change does not always have to be
interpreted as a negative; however, one person's growth may indeed be another person's regres-
sion.
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like BI(a)ck Tea Society, where equitable relief was sought, a procedure that mor-
phs elements of CIPA, the common law state secrets privilege, and existing case
law can be used as a guide to formulate a workable procedure that permits a judge
to use information he normally would not be able to use, in order to come to a fair
but safe conclusion of law. Thus, a suit against the government, or one that tan-
gentially involves the government, where relief of some kind is sought, most likely
equitable, must first identify what "right" underlies the claim. If the claim reason-
ably asserts a violation of an individual's (or group's) constitutional rights, and the
government in response to such a suit declares it has classified material directly
impacting the claim, then the trial court could take the following steps in order to
use the classified material, on the merits, to help decide the case.
First, the information the government has must be positively identified as clas-
sified or present a real risk to national security if released. One manner of such
identification might mirror and expand the CIPA requirements. However, it would
not be enough for the government to simply provide a written statement to the
court asserting that information is privileged, especially if the statement is merely
a broad summary of the sensitive material. Indeed, the trial court would be pre-
sented with a formal declaration of privilege, after working its way up through a
chain of command, from the appropriate government agency's head (or designee).144
Along with the formal declaration, however, the court would hold an ex parte and
in camera hearing regarding the contents of the government's declaration. During
such a hearing, the government would need to disclose the specific harms to na-
tional security that would result if the information were turned over to the oppos-
ing party. 145 In cases in which First Amendment restrictions are imposed during
public events, like those discussed in BI(a)ck Tea Society, the government would
be required to provide to the trial judge specific event threat intelligence. This
information must be particularized. For example, a declaration that details the
likely dates, participants, and methods of attack would be enough to warrant pro-
ceeding to the next step of this proposed process. On the other hand, a declaration
that provides the general nature of a threat that contains no scintilla of specificity
should not be used to decide the merits of a case. Only when the court is clearly
convinced that release of the material presents a danger to national security should
the court properly hold it to be classified or privileged.
Second, if the court agrees with the government that the information is classi-
fied and its release is potentially harmful to the nation, then the court must deter-
mine if, given the facts and circumstances, the information could possibly be ben-
eficial to the opposition. If the trial court is clearly convinced that the information
can in no way help the opposition then the court should deny access to the mate-
rial. And, as opposed to Bl(a)ck Tea Society, the court would use the government's
information, in conjunction with any other applicable rules of law or other facts
144. The underlying purpose of requiring the declaration come from an agency's head is to
reduce the risk of unnecessary or inappropriate invocation of this proposed procedure. The use
of multiple levels of gatekeepers is used elsewhere by the government. See United States Attor-
ney Manual, Procedure with Respect to Appeals Generally, accessed at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/eousa/foia.reading_room/usam/title2/2mapp.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
145. The dissemination of confidential informants'/agents' names, means of intelligence
gathering, or release of information that could impact ongoing or future investigations are some
of the specific national security harms that present valid reasons for nondisclosure.
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known to the court, to make a ruling. In fact, even if Judge Woodlock used the
information that he received from the government in his decision-making process,
he still would have assessed the permissibility of the DZ using the Supreme Court's
First Amendment's time, place, and manner intermediate scrutiny standard of re-
view. If alternative channels of communication had been available, the privileged
information would likely not have been a bar to an equitable resolution.
Third, if the trial court determines the privileged information contains mate-
rial that has the strong potential to aid the opposing party in its case, the court can
offer such party an opportunity to view the material in camera but only under the
narrowest of conditions. Unless the government can redact the material to a level
that eliminates the underlying harm to the government, opposing counsel should
be afforded the time and opportunity to gain a security clearance through the De-
partment of Justice. 146 Once an appropriate level of security clearance is gained
by opposing counsel, the court would then hold an in camera review of the infor-
mation with both sides. Instances where the use of classified information will
greatly help the opposing party will presumably be few. 147 Thus, the volume of
security clearance requests will most likely be minimal. The fact that these clear-
ance requests take considerable time only emphasizes the need for cases to be filed
as early as possible. This is especially true where there is any possibility that
classified information might be involved in the litigation. It must also be noted
that although the issue of timing is vital when attempting to accommodate both
sides of a dispute, the government cannot control when particularized or action-
able intelligence is received. Therefore, this proposal assumes a best case sce-
nario, just as Judge Lipez's concurrence implied. In the end, without government
redaction of the material or the timely granting of a security clearance, opposing
counsel cannot be allowed access to the information.
Fourth, an appeals process is always appropriate. Consistent with Judge Lipez's
view, time will always be a relevant factor, especially if an interlocutory appeal is
sought. However, an ex parte hearing that requires the government to provide the
trial judge specifics, not generalities, should allow for review under a deferential
standard.
Applying this proposed procedure to a hypothetical case may clarify the intent
of its design. For example, a self-described group of anarchists attempt to obtain a
parade permit in order to march in front of the U.S. Naval Academy during com-
mencement ceremonies, which will take place in three months, where a Supreme
Court Justice is scheduled to deliver the keynote speech. Local authorities are
concerned that the anarchists, who have a history of violent protests, will again
become violent. The City of Annapolis refuses to allow the group to march past
the front gate but instead permits them to march on the outskirts of town. The
group files a federal suit asserting that their First Amendment rights have been
146. Part of the new Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004 concerns the security
clearance procedure. The Act attempts to revamp the system and contains a provision designed
to speed up the clearance process. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 3001 (2004).
147. Again, this does not include the criminal context. Cases like Reynolds are more likely to
present circumstances where allegedly sensitive information may be useful to the opposing side;
however, time can be less pressing in a civil suit for damages vis-A-vis suits seeking injunctions
or declaratory relief.
[Vol. 57:2MAINE LAW REVIEW
BL(A)CK TEA SOCIETY v. CITY OF BOSTON
violated. At the same time, federal authorities have received intelligence indicat-
ing an attack of some kind will occur in the vicinity of Washington or Baltimore
sometime in the next three months. The federal government alerts local and state
law enforcement in Maryland and Virginia.
In response to the suit filed by the anarchists, the local police agencies contact
the federal government and request whatever information they have on this new
threat. Indicating that they do have sensitive intelligence, the government agen-
cies move for an ex pare hearing with the district court judge. The judge is pre-
sented with a formal declaration of privileged information by the government. At
the hearing, the judge is told that an investigation is currently underway, which is
focused on a group of eight men living in the Baltimore region. These eight men
are suspected of plotting a series of kidnappings of high-ranking U.S. officials.
Computer files obtained as part of this investigation have shown images of several
Supreme Court justices and numerous United States senators. Additionally, vid-
eotapes seized from overseas operations show teams of terrorists training on how
to attack police-escorted motorcades and kidnap the protected occupants.
Given the specificity of information, including the names of sources and cur-
rent locations of ongoing surveillance, the district judge properly concludes the
information is too sensitive to disperse. The judge will need to assess whether, in
her opinion, release of the unedited material presents a sincere benefit to the plain-
tiffs' case. If so, and with enough time, the plaintiffs can attempt to gain a security
clearance in order to view the sensitive information. Without such clearance, the
judge must refuse to turn the information over to the plaintiffs unless the govern-
ment can safely redact the material. The judge will now consider the information,
along with other arguments made by both parties, to determine the merits of the
case. In a case such as this hypothetical, counsel for the anarchists would likely
argue that the City's requirement, restraining the protestors to march on the out-
skirts of town, was not a narrowly tailored response to security concerns and did
not leave them with adequate alternative channels of communication. On the other
hand, the attorney for the City would rely on the ex parte hearing, as well as re-
mind the court of the prior public events where the anarchists' demonstrations
have resulted in violence.
The judge could now rely on the ex parte hearing as well as the rest of the
arguments made by the parties to come to a resolution. The judge might conclude
that although the threats of kidnappings appear genuine, there is no apparent con-
nection to the anarchist group. Moreover, the specific threats involve motorcade
attacks, and presumably the protestors would not be marching in the streets during
the very time the Supreme Court Justice made her way into the Naval Academy
compound. Thus, even though the judge was allowed to consider the information
obtained ex parte, she still had to apply the particularized threats to the specific
facts of the case. Here, the general concern about prior episodes of violence by the
anarchists, coupled with the particularized threat of kidnapping a government offi-
cial, would probably not justify the City's action. 148
148. The hypothetical used here as an example of the proposal in action is a loose interpreta-
tion of cases previously cited. See supra note 120.
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This hypothetical suggests just one example of how a case involving classi-
fied information might be resolved. It highlights the fact that each case will need
to be resolved on an individual basis, applied to very specific facts. It also demon-
strates an instance where very specific threats might not be enough to overwhelm
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, this Note does not intend to suggest an evisceration of the adversarial
system. Nevertheless, the failure to devise a clear-cut strategy on how to manage
situations that are similar to that of Bl(a)ck Tea Society is likely to result in judg-
ments based on incomplete facts that have the potential to harm individuals, com-
munities, and the nation. The Supreme Court has a history of developing "balanc-
ing tests" when competing interests are involved in litigation. The use of classi-
fied information received by a judge ex parte and in camera to help determine an
issue on the merits presents another opportunity to balance.
Whether it is the Court or Congress, a workable procedure must be designed
to protect national security but not tie the hands of ajudge. Such a procedure must
balance protecting the adversarial judicial system with the need for keeping intel-
ligence means and methods secure. Form should not necessarily win over func-
tion. Function must pay its -due respect to form. Here, there are many logical (and
emotional) arguments to be made over whether to use some ex parte information
on the merits. It is a debate worth having but one that should be resolved soon.
It is ironic that the current swirling public debate over elements of the Patriot
Act beguiles the reality of national security law in this country. 149 Before CIPA
was enacted in 1980 and former Attorney General John Ashcroft raised hackles,
the state secrets privilege was recognized in the courts. Protecting state secrets has
been, and remains, a superior need. The attacks on September 11th changed how
many Americans view the stability and safety of the nation, but presently there is
far from a consensus on how best to achieve security. Nevertheless, while the
legal community must remain ever vigilant against abuse and injustice, it should
not place its head in the sand. A proactive approach that seeks to change the way
that things have always been done, like the one proposed here, which is intended
to secure fair, just, and now safe decisions, will hopefully preserve our great sys-
tem of law. Failure to recognize the need for change during this unprecedented
period of terror runs the risk of providing fodder for those who would demand an
unmeasured response to the next attack. The integrity of our system of law cer-
tainly should depend on logic, not fear.
Brian M. Tomney
149. Certainly there are many elements to the Patriot Act that concern both the general public
and the legal community. Indeed, some of these concerns may be valid; however, the desire to
keep the nation safe and its secrets secure has frequently resulted in new laws, regulations, and
procedures. Admittedly, not all of those laws, regulations, and procedures were drafted or used
in a manner consistent with demonstrating the highest respect for the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (endorsing the use of internment camps
for Japanese Americans during World War II). For an expansive review of the history and
origins of national security law, the role of the U.S. Constitution, and the relationship to interna-
tional law and treaties, see generally, STEPHEN Dycus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAw (3d ed.
2002).
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